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Abstract
The central question in quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems is whether or not entangle-
ment shared between provers affects the verification power of the proof system. We study for the first
time positive aspects of prior entanglement and show that entanglement is useful even for honest provers.
We show how to use shared entanglement to parallelize any multi-prover quantum interactive proof sys-
tem to a one-round system with perfect completeness, with one extra prover. Alternatively, we can also
parallelize to a three-turn system with the same number of provers, where the verifier only broadcasts the
outcome of a coin flip. This “public-coin” property is somewhat surprising, since in the classical case
public-coin multi-prover interactive proofs are equivalent to single prover ones.
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1 Introduction
Multi-prover interactive proof systems are a central notion in theoretical computer science. An im-
portant generalization of interactive proof systems [GMR89, Bab85], they were originally introduced
in [BOGKW88] in a cryptographic context. Later it was shown [BFL91, FRS94] that the class MIP of
languages having a multi-prover interactive proof system is equal to NEXP, which led to the development
of the theory of inapproximability and probabilistically checkable proofs [FGL+96, AS98, ALM+98].
In a multi-prover interactive proof system, a verifier communicates with several provers, which do not
communicate with each other. One of the central challenges in this area is to understand the power of
quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems (QMIP systems). In particular, the major open question is
how entanglement shared among the provers affects these systems. This question is unique to the quantum
world, since the related classical resource of shared randomness is known not to affect the power of such
systems. It is not even clear whether entanglement increases or decreases the verification power of QMIP
systems. On one hand, using entanglement, dishonest provers might cheat more easily, thereby breaking the
soundness of the system. On the other hand, the increased power that entanglement gives to honest provers
could be harnessed by the verifier, increasing the expressivity of the proof system.
To the best of our knowledge, all previous results in this area (see below) have focused on the former
case, studying the negative effects of entanglement, i.e., whether or not dishonest entangled provers can
break proof systems that are sound for any dishonest unentangled provers. Our work is the first to focus on
the positive aspects of entanglement, where shared entanglement may be advantageous to honest provers.
1.1 Previous and related work
Kobayashi and Matsumoto [KM03] introduced QMIP systems with a quantum verifier, and proved that
the class of languages having a quantum multi-prover interactive proof system is equal to NEXP when
the provers do not share any prior entanglement, and is contained in NEXP when they share at most
polynomially many entangled qubits. Cleve, Høyer, Toner, and Watrous [CHTW04] studied multi-prover
interactive proof systems in which the verifier remains classical but provers may initially share entan-
glement, and presented several protocols for which shared EPR pairs can increase the power of dis-
honest provers. They also proved that the class of languages having some restricted version of multi-
prover interactive proof system, denoted by ⊕MIP∗(2, 1), is contained in EXP when provers are al-
lowed to share prior entanglement (Wehner [Weh06] improved the upper bound to QIP(2), the class
of languages having a two-message quantum interactive proof system), which is in stark contrast to the
corresponding class ⊕MIP(2, 1) without prior entanglement, which is equal to NEXP1. Very recently,
Kempe, Kobayashi, Matsumoto, Toner, and Vidick [KKM+07] gave limits on the cheating power of dis-
honest entangled provers in some quantum and classical multi-prover interactive proof systems, by show-
ing how such proof systems can be “immunized” against the use of entanglement by dishonest provers.
Ito, Kobayashi, Preda, Sun, and Yao [IKP+07] and Cleve, Gavinsky, and Jain [CGJ07] also gave limits on
the cheating power of entangled provers for some classical multi-prover interactive proof systems.
All these studies focus only on the negative aspects of prior entanglement, i.e., whether or not dishonest
but prior-entangled provers can break the soundness of the proof system.
1.2 Our Results
This paper studies the positive aspects of prior entanglement and shows a number of general properties of
QMIP systems, extensively using prior entanglement for honest provers. This gives the first evidence that
prior entanglement is useful even for honest provers. Our main theorem states that any quantum k-prover
1for some two-sided bounded error
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interactive proof system that may involve polynomially many rounds can be parallelized to a one-round
quantum (k + 1)-prover interactive proof system of perfect completeness and such that the gap between
completeness and soundness accepting probabilities is still bounded by an inverse-polynomial.
To state our results more precisely, let QMIP(k,m, c, s) denote the class of languages having an m-turn
quantum k-prover interactive proof system with completeness at least c and soundness at most s, where
provers are allowed to share an arbitrary amount of entanglement. We call the difference c − s the “gap”
in this paper. As commonly used in classical multi-prover interactive proofs we use the term “round” to
describe an interaction consisting of questions from the verifier followed by answers from the provers. We
use the term “turn” for messages sent in one direction. One round consists of two turns: a turn for the verifier
and a turn for the provers. Let poly and poly−1 be the sets of all polynomially bounded functions and all
inverse-polynomial functions, respectively. Throughout this paper we assume that the number m of turns
and the number k of provers are functions in poly with respect to the input size, and that completeness c and
soundness s are functions of the input size c, s : Z+ → [0, 1]. Then we show the following main theorem.
Theorem 1. For any k,m ∈ poly and c, s satisfying c− s ∈ poly−1 there exists a function p ∈ poly such
that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP
(
k + 1, 2, 1, 1 − 1p
)
.
Since it is easy to amplify the success probability without increasing the number of rounds by running
multiple instances of a proof system in parallel using a different set of provers for every instance, the above
theorem shows that one-round (i.e., two-turn) QMIP systems are as powerful as general QMIP systems.
Corollary 2. For any k,m ∈ poly and c, s satisfying c− s ∈ poly−1, and p ∈ poly, there exists k′ ∈ poly
such that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k′, 2, 1, 2−p).
The proof of our main theorem comes in three parts, corresponding to Sections 3, 4, and 5. The first
part shows how to convert any QMIP system with two-sided bounded error into one with one-sided bounded
error of perfect completeness without changing the number of provers. The second part shows that any
QMIP system with polynomially many turns can be parallelized to one with only three turns (messages
from the provers followed by questions from the verifier followed by responses from the provers) in which
the gap between completeness and soundness is still bounded by an inverse-polynomial. Again the number
of provers remains the same in this transformation. Finally, the third part shows that any three-turn QMIP
system with sufficiently large gap can be converted into a two-turn (i.e., one-round) QMIP system with
inverse-polynomial gap, by adding an extra prover.
Similar statements to our first and second parts have already been shown by Kitaev and Watrous [KW00]
for single-prover quantum interactive proofs. Their proofs, however, heavily rely on the fact that a single
quantum prover can apply arbitrary operators over all the space except for the private space of the verifier.
This is not the case any more for quantum multi-prover interactive proofs, since now a quantum prover
cannot access the qubits in the private spaces of the other quantum provers, in addition to those in the
private space of the verifier. Hence new methods are required for the multi-prover case.
To transform proof systems so that they have perfect completeness, our basic idea is to use the quantum
rewinding technique developed for quantum zero-knowledge proofs by Watrous [Wat06], but in a different
way. In our case we use it to “rewind” an unsuccessful computation that would result in rejection into a suc-
cessful one. To apply the quantum rewinding technique, we first modify the proof system so that the honest
provers can convince the verifier with probability exactly 12 using some initial shared state and moreover
no other initial shared state achieves a higher acceptance probability. This initial shared state corresponds
to the auxiliary input in the case of quantum zero-knowledge proofs, and thus, as in that scenario, the se-
quence of forward, backward, and forward executions of the protocol achieves perfect completeness. The
obvious problem of this construction lies in proving soundness, as the dishonest provers may not use the
same strategies for all of the three executions of the proof system. To settle this, we design a simple protocol
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that tests if the second backward execution is indeed a backward simulation of the first forward execution.
The verifier performs with equal probability either the original rewinding protocol or this invertibility test
without revealing which test the provers are undergoing. This forces the provers to use essentially the same
strategies for the first two executions of the protocol, which is sufficient to bound the soundness. As a result
we prove the following.
Theorem 3. For any k,m ∈ poly and c, s satisfying c− s ∈ poly−1, and p ∈ poly, there exists m′ ∈ poly
such that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k,m′, 1, 2−p).
For the parallelization to three turns, our approach is to first show that any QMIP system with sufficiently
large gap can be converted into another QMIP system with the same number of provers, in which the number
of rounds (turns) becomes almost half of that in the original proof system. The proof idea is that the verifier
in the first turn receives the snapshot state from the original system after (almost) half of turns have been
executed, and then with equal probability executes either a forward-simulation or a backward-simulation of
the original system from that turn on. Honest provers only have to simulate the original system to convince
the verifier, while any strategy of dishonest provers with unallowable high success probability would lead to
a strategy of dishonest provers in the original system that contradicts the soundness condition. By repeatedly
applying this modification, together with Theorem 3 as preprocessing, we can convert any QMIP system into
a three-turn QMIP system with the same number of provers that still has an inverse polynomial gap.
Theorem 4. For any k,m ∈ poly and c, s satisfying c− s ∈ poly−1, there exists p ∈ poly such that
QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP
(
k, 3, 1, 1 − 1p
)
.
For k = 1, this gives an alternative proof of the parallelization theorem due to Kitaev and Wa-
trous [KW00] for single-prover quantum interactive proofs. It is interesting to note that our parallelization
method does not need the controlled-swap test at all, while it is the key test in the Kitaev-Watrous paralleliza-
tion method. Another point worth mentioning in our method is that, at every time step of our parallelized
protocol, the whole system has only one snapshot state of the original system. This is in contrast to the
fact that the whole system has to simultaneously treat many snapshot states in the Kitaev-Watrous method.
The merit of our method is, thus, that we do not need to treat the possible entanglement among different
snapshot states when analyzing soundness, which may be a main reason why our method works well even
for the multi-prover case. Moreover, our method is more space-efficient than the Kitaev-Watrous method,
in particular when we parallelize a system with polynomially many rounds.
To prove the third part, we will take a detour by proving that
(i) any three-turn QMIP system with sufficiently large gap can be modified to a three-turn public-coin
QMIP system with the same number of provers and a gap of roughly similar order of magnitude,
(ii) any three-turn public-coin QMIP system can be converted into a two-turn QMIP system without
changing completeness and soundness, by adding one extra prover.
The notion of public-coin QMIP systems we use is a natural generalization of public-coin quantum in-
teractive proofs in the single-prover case introduced by Marriott and Watrous [MW05]. The corresponding
complexity class is denoted by QMIPpub(k,m, c, s) in this paper. Intuitively, at every round, a public-coin
quantum verifier flips a fair classical coin at most polynomially many times, and then simply broadcasts the
result of these coin-flips to all the provers. Property (i) is a generalization of the result by Marriott and Wa-
trous [MW05] to the multi-prover case, whereas property (ii) is completely new. The idea to prove (ii),
assuming that the number of provers in the original proof system is k, is to send questions only to the first k
provers in the new (k+1)-prover system, requesting the original second messages from the k provers in the
original system. The verifier expects to receive from the (k + 1)-st prover the original first messages from
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the k provers in the original system without asking any question to that prover. The public-coin property
of the original system implies the nonadaptiveness of the messages from the verifier, which is essential to
prove (ii). In fact, there is a way to directly prove the third part, but our detour enables us to show another
two important properties of QMIP systems. Specifically, property (i) essentially proves the equivalence of
public-coin quantum k-prover interactive proofs and general quantum k-prover interactive proofs, for any
k.
Theorem 5. For any k,m ∈ poly and c, s satisfying c− s ∈ poly−1, and p ∈ poly, there exists m′ ∈ poly
such that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIPpub(k,m′, 1, 2−p).
Note that in the classical case, public-coin multi-prover interactive proofs are only as powerful as single-
prover interactive proofs: because every prover receives the same question from the verifier it means that
every prover knows how other provers will behave and the joint strategy of the provers can therefore be
simulated by a single prover. Hence, these systems cannot be as powerful as general classical multi-prover
interactive proofs unless NEXP = PSPACE. In contrast, our result shows that in the quantum case, public-
coin QMIP systems are as powerful as general QMIP systems. The non-triviality of public-coin QMIP
systems may be explained as follows: even if every quantum prover knows how other quantum provers will
behave, still each quantum prover can apply only local transformations over a part of some state that may
be entangled among the provers, which is not enough to simulate every possible strategy a single quantum
prover could follow.
Property (ii) for the case k = 1 implies that any language in QIP (and thus in PSPACE) has a two-
prover one-round quantum interactive proof system of perfect completeness with exponentially small error
in soundness, since any language in QIP has a three-message public-coin quantum interactive proof system
of perfect completeness with exponentially small error in soundness [MW05].
Corollary 6. For any p ∈ poly, QIP ⊆ QMIP(2, 2, 1, 2−p) (and thus PSPACE ⊆ QMIP(2, 2, 1, 2−p)).
In the classical case a similar statement to the last corollary was shown by Cai, Condon, and Lip-
ton [CCL94] (and the stronger statement that two-prover one-round interactive proofs are as powerful as
general multi-prover interactive proofs was shown later by Feige and Lova´sz [FL92]). All these results
are, however, not known to hold under the existence of prior entanglement among the provers. Before our
result, it has even been open if PSPACE has a two-prover one-round quantum interactive proof system.
(Very recently, Kempe et al. [KKM+07] succeeded in proving that the classical two-prover one-round inter-
active proof system for PSPACE in Ref. [CCL94] is sound in a weak sense against any pair of dishonest
prior-entangled provers: soundness is bounded away from one by an inverse-polynomial. Their result is
incomparable to ours since on one hand we have a much stronger soundness condition, and on the other
both the verifier and the honest provers must be quantum. In contrast, in Ref. [KKM+07] both of them just
follow a classical protocol.)
Finally, we stress again that our constructions extensively use the prior shared entanglement of the
provers in a positive sense. In particular, even if the honest provers in the original proof system do not need
any prior entanglement at all, the honest provers in the constructed proof system do need prior entanglement
in many cases. Most of the properties proved in this paper (Theorems 1 and 5 and Corollary 6 in particu-
lar) are not known to hold when considering only initially unentangled honest provers, and thus give first
evidence that sharing prior entanglement may be advantageous even to honest provers.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the quantum formalism, including the quantum circuit model and
definitions of mixed quantum states (density operators) and fidelity (all of which are discussed in detail in
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Refs. [NC00, KSV02], for instance). This section summarizes some of the notions and notations that are
used in this paper, reviews the model of quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems and introduces the
notion of public-coin quantum multi-prover interactive proof systems.
As in earlier work [Wat03, KW00, KM03], we define QMIP systems in terms of quantum circuits. It is
assumed that our circuits consist of unitary gates, which is sufficient since non-unitary and unitary quantum
circuits are equivalent in computational power [AKN98]. To avoid unnecessary complication, however, in
the subsequent sections the descriptions of protocols often include non-unitary operations (measurements).
Even in such cases, it is always possible to construct unitary quantum circuits that essentially achieve the
same outcome. A notable exception is in the definition of the public-coin quantum verifier, where we want
to define the public coin-flip to be a classical operation. This requires a non-unitary operation for the verifier,
the (classical) public coin-flip.
When proving statements that involve the perfect-completeness property, we assume that our universal
gate set satisfies some conditions, which may not hold with an arbitrary universal gate set. Specifically, we
assume that the Hadamard transformation and any classical reversible transformations are exactly imple-
mentable in our gate set. Note that this condition is satisfied by most of the standard gate sets including the
Shor basis [Sho96] consisting of the Hadamard gate, the controlled-i-phase-shift gate, and the Toffoli gate,
and thus, we believe that this condition is not restrictive. We stress that most of our main statements do
hold with an arbitrary choice of universal gate set (the completeness and soundness conditions may become
worse by negligible amounts in some of the claims, which does not affect the final main statements).
All Hilbert spaces in this paper are of dimension a power of two, spanned by qubits. We will use the
following property of fidelity.
Lemma 7 ([SR02, NS03]). For any density operators ρ, σ, ξ over a Hilbert space H,
F (ρ, σ)2 + F (σ, ξ)2 ≤ 1 + F (ρ, ξ).
Quantum Multi-Prover Interactive Proof Systems (QMIP systems): Throughout this paper k and k′
denote the number of provers and m,m′ denote the number of turns. All of these are from the set of
polynomially bounded functions in the input size |x|, denoted by poly. Further, c and s denote functions of
the input size into [0, 1] corresponding to completeness and soundness. For notational convenience in what
follows we will omit the arguments of these functions.
A quantum k-prover interactive proof system consists of a verifier V with private quantum register V
and k provers P1, . . . , Pk with private quantum registers P1, . . . ,Pk, as well as quantum message registers
M1, . . . ,Mk, which without loss of generality are assumed to have the same number of qubits, denoted by
qM. One of the private qubits of the verifier is designated as the output qubit. At the beginning of the
protocol, all the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) are initialized to |0 · · · 0〉, and the qubits in (P1, . . . ,Pk) are in
some a priori shared state |Φ〉 prepared by the provers in advance (and hence possibly entangled), which
w.l.o.g. can be assumed to be pure. No direct communication between the provers is allowed after that.
The protocol consists of alternating turns of the provers and of the verifier, starting with the verifier, if m is
even, and with the provers otherwise. At a turn of the verifier, V applies some polynomial-time circuit to the
qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and then sends each register Mi to prover Pi. At a turn of the provers each prover
Pi applies some transformation to the registers (Pi,Mi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and sends Mi back to the verifier.
The last turn is always a turn for the provers. After the last turn the verifier applies a polynomial-time circuit
to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and then measures the output qubit in the standard basis, accepting if the
outcome is |1〉 and rejecting otherwise.
Formally, an m-turn polynomial-time quantum verifier V for k-prover QMIP systems is a polynomial-
time computable mapping from input strings x to a set of polynomial-time uniformly generated circuits
{V 1, . . . , V ⌈m+1/2⌉}, and a partition of the space on which they act into registers (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), which
consist of polynomially many qubits. Similarly an m-turn quantum prover P is a mapping from x to a set of
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circuits {P 1, . . . , P ⌈m+1/2⌉} each acting on registers (P,M). No restrictions are placed on the complexity
of this mapping or the size of P. We will denote the i-th prover, his registers and transformations with
a subscript i. We will always assume that each prover Pi is compatible with the verifier, i.e. that the
corresponding register Mi is the same for the verifier and the prover for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The protocol (V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) is the alternating application of prover’s and verifier’s circuits to the
state |0 · · · 0〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 in registers (V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk). For odd m, circuits P 11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P 1k , V 1,
P 21 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P 2k , V 2 and so on are applied in sequence terminating with V m+1/2. If m is even, the sequence
begins with V 1 followed by P 11 ⊗· · ·⊗P 1k and so on up to V m+2/2. We say that (V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) accepts
x if the designated output qubit in V is measured in |1〉 at the end of the protocol and call the probability
with which this happens pacc(x, V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉).
Definition 8. A language L is in QMIP(k,m, c, s) iff there exists an m-turn polynomial-time quantum
verifier V for quantum k-prover interactive proof systems such that, for every input x:
(Completeness) if x ∈ L, there exist m-turn quantum provers P1, . . . , Pk and an a priori shared state |Φ〉
such that pacc(x, V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) ≥ c,
(Soundness) if x 6∈ L, for any m-turn quantum provers P ′1, . . . , P ′k and any a priori shared state |Φ′〉,
pacc(x, V, P
′
1, . . . , P
′
k, |Φ′〉) ≤ s.
Next, we introduce the notions of public-coin quantum verifier and public-coin QMIP systems. These
are natural generalizations of the corresponding notions in the single-prover case introduced by Mar-
riott and Watrous [MW05]. Intuitively, a quantum verifier for quantum multi-prover interactive proof sys-
tems is public-coin if, at each of his turns, after receiving the message registers from the provers, he first
flips a fair classical coin at most a polynomial number of times, and then simply broadcasts the result of
these coin-flips to all the provers. No other messages are sent from the verifier to the provers. At the end
of the protocol, the verifier applies some quantum operation to the messages received so far, and decides
acceptance or rejection.
Formally, an m-turn polynomial-time quantum verifier for k-prover interactive proof systems is public-
coin if each of the circuits V 1, V 2, . . . , V ⌈m−1/2⌉ implements the following procedure: V receives the
message registers Mi from the provers, stores them in his private space, and then flips a classical fair coin
at most qM times to generate a public string rj , records rj in his private space, and broadcasts rj to all the
provers. The circuit V ⌈(m+1)/2⌉ is some unitary transformation controlled by all the recorded random strings
rj for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌈(m− 1)/2⌉. A QMIP system is public-coin if the associated verifier is public-coin, and we
define QMIPpub(k,m, c, s) to be the class of languages in QMIP(k,m, c, s) with a public-coin verifier.
3 QMIP with Perfect Completeness Equals General QMIP
In this section we prove Theorem 3, showing that any QMIP system with two-sided bounded error can be
transformed into a one with one-sided bounded error of perfect completeness without changing the number
of provers. For the case of a single prover, this was shown by Kitaev and Watrous [KW00], but their proof
relies on the single prover performing a global unitary on the whole system, and therefore does not carry
over to the multi-prover case (no prover has access to the other prover’s private spaces and the private space
of each prover might be arbitrarily large, so we cannot use the verifier to transfer those spaces from one
prover to the other).
First, we introduce the notion of perfectly rewindable QMIP systems.
Definition 9. Let s < 12 . A language L has a perfectly rewindable m-turn quantum k-prover interactive
proof system with soundness at most s iff there exists an m-turn polynomial-time quantum verifier V , such
that, for every input x:
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(Perfect Rewindability) if x ∈ L, there exists a set of m-turn quantum provers P1, . . . , Pk such that
max|Φ〉 pacc(x, V, P1, . . . , Pk, |Φ〉) = 12 , where the maximum is taken over all a priori shared states
|Φ〉 prepared by P1, . . . , Pk .
(Soundness) if x 6∈ L, for any set of m-turn quantum provers P ′1, . . . , P ′k and any a priori shared state |Φ′〉,
pacc(x, V, P
′
1, . . . , P
′
k, |Φ′〉) ≤ s.2
We first show how to modify any general QMIP system (with some appropriate conditions on complete-
ness and soundness) to a perfectly rewindable one with the same k and m.
Lemma 10. Let c ≥ 12 > s. Then, any language L in QMIP(k,m, c, s) has a perfectly rewindable m-turn
quantum k-prover interactive proof system with soundness at most s.
Proof. Let L be a language in QMIP(k,m, c, s) and V be the corresponding m-turn quantum verifier. We
slightly modify V to construct another m-turn quantum verifier W for a perfectly rewindable proof system
for L. The new verifier W , in addition to the registers of V , prepares another single-qubit register B,
initialized to |0〉. For the first m − 2 turns, W simply simulates V . In the (m − 1)-st turn, a turn for the
verifier, W proceeds like V would, but sends B to the first prover in addition to the qubits V would send in
the original proof system. In the m-th turn the first prover is requested to send B back to W , in addition to
the qubits sent to V in the original proof system. Then W proceeds for the final decision procedure like V
would, but accepts iff V would have accepted and B is in the state |1〉.3 Notice that W accepts only if V
would have accepted, so the soundness is obviously at most s in the constructed proof system.
For perfect rewindability we slightly modify the protocol for honest provers in the case x ∈ L. Let |Φ∗〉
be the a priori shared state in the original proof system that maximizes the acceptance probability for the
original honest provers and let pmax be that maximal acceptance probability. The new provers use |Φ∗〉 as
the a priori shared state and simulate the original provers except for the last turn. The only difference is that
in the last turn the first prover proceeds as P1 would, and applies a one-qubit unitary T to the qubit in B,
T : |0〉 →
√
1− 1
2pmax
|0〉+
√
1
2pmax
|1〉.
From the construction it is obvious that the maximum accepting probability is exactly equal to 12 and that
this maximum is achieved when the provers use the a priori shared state |Φ∗〉. 
Now, we are ready to show the following lemma.
Lemma 11. Let c ≥ 12 and s < 125 . Then, QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP
(
k, 3m, 1, 12 + 2
√
s+ 5s2
)
.
Proof. The intuitive idea behind the proof of this lemma, using Watrous’ “quantum rewinding technique”,
has already been explained in the introduction. We add some more intuition before proceeding to the tech-
nical proof. Using Lemma 10 we can assume that in the case of honest provers (x ∈ L) the acceptance
probability with shared state |Φ∗〉 is exactly 12 and furthermore that no other a priori shared state achieves
higher acceptance probability. The acceptance probability when the provers use any a priori shared state |Φ〉
can be written as pacc = ‖ΠaccQ|Ψ〉‖2 = ‖ΠaccQΠinit|Ψ〉‖2, where |Ψ〉 = |0 · · · 0〉(V,M1,...,Mk) ⊗ |Φ〉, Q
is the unitary transformation induced by the QMIP system just before the verifier’s final measurement, Πinit
2Note that both for completeness and soundness we first fix the provers’ transformations and then maximize over all a priori
shared states, which hence have a fixed dimension.
3This protocol can be brought into the standard form where only one qubit is measured to decide acceptance. Call Y the register
containing the designated output qubit for V . W adds a new single-qubit output register X, initialized to |0〉. At the end of the
protocol W performs a Toffoli gate on the qubits in B,Y,X controlled by the qubits in (B,Y). Clearly X will contain |1〉 iff both
B and Y contain |1〉.
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is the projection on |0 · · · 0〉(V,M1,...,Mk) and Πacc is the projection on |1〉 of the designated output qubit. In
other words the state |Ψ∗〉 = |0 · · · 0〉(V,M1,...,Mk) ⊗ |Φ∗〉 maximizes the expression
max
|Ψ〉
〈Ψ|ΠinitQ†ΠaccQΠinit|Ψ〉,
meaning that the matrix M = ΠinitQ†ΠaccQΠinit has maximum eigenvalue 12 with corresponding eigenvec-
tor |Ψ∗〉. Now we apply the quantum rewinding technique by performing forward, backward, and forward
executions of the proof system in sequence. Perfect completeness follows from the fact that the initial state is
an eigenvector of M with the corresponding eigenvalue exactly 12 , exactly as in the zero-knowledge scenario
of [Wat06].
The challenge of this construction lies in the proof of soundness. If the input is a no-instance, the
maximum eigenvalue of any matrix M corresponding to our proof system is small. This shows that if the
dishonest provers are actually “not so dishonest”, i.e., if they use the same strategies for all of the three
(forward, backward, and forward) executions of the original proof system, the acceptance probability is
still small. However, the problem arises when the dishonest provers change their strategies for some of the
three executions. To settle this, we design a simple protocol that tests if the backward execution is indeed a
backward simulation of the first forward execution. The verifier performs the original rewinding protocol or
this invertibility test uniformly at random without revealing which test the provers are undergoing. Honest
provers always pass this invertibility test, and thus perfect completeness is preserved. When the input is a
no-instance, this forces the provers to use approximately the same strategies for the first two executions of
the proof system, which is sufficient to bound the soundness.
We now proceed with the technical details. Let L be a language in QMIP(k,m, c, s) and let V be
the verifier in the perfectly rewindable m-turn quantum k-prover interactive proof system for L as per
Lemma 10. We construct a 3m-turn quantum verifierW of a new quantum k-prover interactive proof system
for L. W has the same registers as V in the original proof system, and performs one of two tests, which we
call “REWINDING TEST” and “INVERTIBILITY TEST”. The exact protocol is described in Figure 1, where
for simplicity it is assumed that m is even (the case in which m is odd can be proved in a similar manner).
Completeness: Assume the input x is in L. From the original provers P1, . . . , Pk we design honest
provers R1, . . . , Rk for the constructed 3m-turn system. Each new prover Ri has the same quantum register
Pi as Pi has, and the new provers initially share |Φ∗〉. For the first m turns each Ri simulates Pi. At the
(m+2j)-th turn for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 , Ri applies (P
m
2
−j+1
i )
† (i.e. the inverse of the (m− 2j +2)-nd turn of the
original Pi) . Finally, for the (2m+ 2j)-th turn for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 , Ri again applies P ji .
It is obvious from this construction that the provers R1, . . . , Rk can convince W with certainty when W
performs the INVERTIBILITY TEST. We show that R1, . . . , Rk can convince W with certainty even when
W performs the REWINDING TEST. In short, this holds for essentially the same reason that the quantum
rewinding technique works well in the case of quantum zero-knowledge proofs, and we will closely follow
that proof.
For notational convenience, let P˜ j = P j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P jk for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 , and let
Q = V
m
2
+1P˜
m
2 V
m
2 · · · P˜ 1V 1. Recall that M |Ψ∗〉 = 12 |Ψ∗〉 where M = ΠinitQ†ΠaccQΠinit. De-
fine the unnormalized states |φ0〉, |φ1〉, |ψ0〉, and |ψ1〉 by
|φ0〉 = ΠaccQ|Ψ∗〉, |φ1〉 = ΠrejQ|Ψ∗〉, |ψ0〉 = ΠinitQ†|φ0〉, |ψ1〉 = ΠillegalQ†|φ0〉,
where Πillegal = I(V,M1,...,Mk) −Πinit is the projection onto states orthogonal to |0 · · · 0〉(V,M1,...,Mk) and
Πrej = I(V,M1,...,Mk) −Πacc. Then, noticing that |Ψ∗〉 = Πinit|Ψ∗〉, we have
|ψ0〉 = ΠinitQ†ΠaccQ|Ψ∗〉 = ΠinitQ†ΠaccQΠinit|Ψ∗〉 =M |Ψ∗〉 = 1
2
|Ψ∗〉,
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Verifier’s Protocol for Achieving Perfect Completeness
1. Simulate the original verifier for the first m turns.
2. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. If b = 0, move to the REWINDING TEST described in Step 3,
while if b = 1, move to the INVERTIBILITY TEST described in Step 4.
3. (REWINDING TEST)
3.1 Apply V
m
2
+1 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Accept if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) cor-
responds to an accepting state in the original proof system. Otherwise apply (V m2 +1)† to the
qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.2 For j = m2 down to 2, do the following:
Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V j)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk),
and send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.3 Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Perform a controlled-phase-flip: multiply the phase by −1 if all the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk)
are in state |0〉. Apply V1 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and send Mi to the ith prover, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.4 For j = 2 to m2 , do the following:
Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply V j to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk), and
send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.5 Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply V m2 +1 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Accept if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) corresponds to an accepting state in the original proof
system, and reject otherwise.
4. (INVERTIBILITY TEST)
4.1 Send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4.2 For j = m2 down to 2, do the following:
Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V j)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk),
and send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4.3 Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Accept if all the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) are in state |0〉, and reject otherwise.
Figure 1: Verifier’s protocol for achieving perfect completeness
and thus,
Q†|φ1〉 = Q†ΠrejQ|Ψ∗〉 = |Ψ∗〉−Q†ΠaccQ|Ψ∗〉 = |Ψ∗〉−Q†|φ0〉 = 2|ψ0〉− (|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉) = |ψ0〉−|ψ1〉.
Hence, the state just before the controlled-phase-flip in Step 3.3 when entering the REWINDING TEST is
exactly
1
‖|φ1〉‖Q
†|φ1〉 = 1‖|φ1〉‖(|ψ0〉 − |ψ1〉).
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Since Πinit|ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉 and Πinit|ψ1〉 = 0, the controlled-phase-flip changes the state to
− 1‖|φ1〉‖(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉) = −
1
‖|φ1〉‖Q
†|φ0〉.
Therefore, the state just after V m2 +1 is applied in Step 3.5 is exactly
− 1‖|φ1〉‖QQ
†|φ0〉 = − 1‖|φ1〉‖|φ0〉,
and thus, the fact that Πacc|φ0〉 = |φ0〉 implies that the verifier W always accepts in Step 3.5.
Soundness: Now suppose that the input x is not in L. Let R′1, . . . , R′k be any k provers for the con-
structed 3m-turn proof system, and let |ψ〉 be any a priori shared state. Let Rji be the transformation that R′i
applies at his 2j-th turn, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3m2 and let Z denote the controlled-phase-flip operator
in Step 3.3. Call R˜j = Rj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Rjk for 1 ≤ t ≤ 3m2 , and define
U1 = R˜
m
2 V
m
2 · · · R˜2V 2R˜1V 1,
U2 = (V
1)†R˜m · · · (V m2 −1)†R˜m2 +2(V m2 )†R˜m2 +1,
U3 = R˜
3m
2 V
m
2 · · · R˜m+2V 2R˜m+1V 1.
There are three cases of acceptance in the constructed proof system. In the first case, the verifierW performs
the REWINDING TEST and accepts in Step 3.1. This happens with probability p12 , where
p1 = ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖2.
In the second case, the verifier W performs the REWINDING TEST and accepts in Step 3.5. This happens
with probability p22 , where
p2 = ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖2.
Finally, in the third case, the verifier W performs the INVERTIBILITY TEST and accepts in Step 4.3. This
happens with probability p32 , where
p3 = ‖ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖2.
Hence, the total probability pacc that W accepts x when communicating with R′1, . . . , R′k is given by
pacc =
1
2(p1 + p2 + p3). From the soundness condition of the original proof system, it is obvious that
p1 ≤ s. We shall show that p2 ≤ 1 + 4
√
s+ 4s− p3. This implies that pacc ≤ 12 + 2
√
s+ 5s2 , and the
soundness condition follows.
Using the triangle inequality, we have that
‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖
≤ ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉 −ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉‖
+ ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉 −ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖
+ ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖. (1)
The first term of the right-hand side of inequality (1) can be bounded from above as follows:
‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉 −ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉‖
≤ ‖V m2 +1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉 − V
m
2
+1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉‖
= ‖(V m2 +1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉 − U1|ψ〉‖ = ‖ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉 − V
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖
= ‖ −ΠaccV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖ = ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖ = √p1 ≤
√
s.
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The second term of the right-hand side of inequality (1) can be bounded from above as follows:
‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉 −ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖
≤ ‖V m2 +1U3ZU2U1|ψ〉 − V
m
2
+1U3ZΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖
= ‖U2U1|ψ〉 −ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖ = ‖ΠillegalU2U1|ψ〉‖ =
√
1− p3.
Here the last equality follows from the facts that U2U1|ψ〉 = ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉+ΠillegalU2U1|ψ〉 is a unit vec-
tor, that ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉 and ΠillegalU2U1|ψ〉 are orthogonal, and that ‖ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖2 = p3.
Finally, since ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉 is an unnormalized state parallel to some legal initial state and
ZΠinit = −Πinit from the definitions of Z and Πinit, the third term of the right-hand side of inequality (1)
can be bounded as follows by using the soundness condition of the original proof system:
‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖ = ‖−ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖ = ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ΠinitU2U1|ψ〉‖ ≤
√
s.
Putting everything together, we have
p2 = ‖ΠaccV
m
2
+1U3ZU2(V
m
2
+1)†ΠrejV
m
2
+1U1|ψ〉‖2
≤ (2√s+
√
1− p3)2 = 1 + 4
√
s(1− p3) + 4s− p3 ≤ 1 + 4
√
s+ 4s− p3,
as desired. 
Now Theorem 3 follows immediately from Lemma 11 by appropriately applying sequential repetition.
4 Parallelizing to Three Turns
In this section we prove Theorem 4, which reduces the number of turns to three without changing the
number of provers. This is done by repeatedly converting any (2l + 1)-turn QMIP system into a (2l−1 + 1)-
turn QMIP system where the gap decreases, but is still bounded by an inverse-polynomial. We first show
the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let c2 > s. Then, QMIP(k, 4m + 1, c, s) ⊆ QMIP
(
k, 2m+ 1, 1+c2 ,
1+
√
s
2
)
.
Proof. Let L be a language in QMIP(k, 4m + 1, c, s) and let V be the corresponding (4m+ 1)-turn quan-
tum verifier. We construct a (2m+ 1)-turn quantum verifier W for the new quantum k-prover interactive
proof system for L. The idea is thatW first receives the snapshot state that V would have in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk)
just after the (2m+ 1)-st turn of the original system. W then executes with equal probability either a
forward-simulation of the original system from the (2m+ 1)-st turn or a backward-simulation of the origi-
nal system from the (2m+ 1)-st turn. In the former case, W accepts if and only if the simulation results in
acceptance in the original proof system, while in the latter case W accepts if and only if the qubits in V are
in state |0 · · · 0〉.4 The details are given in Figure 2.
Completeness: Assume the input x is in L. Let P1, . . . , Pk be the honest quantum provers
in the original proof system with a priori shared state |Φ〉. Let |ψ2m+1〉 be the quantum state in
(V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk) just after the (2m+ 1)-st turn in the original proof system. We construct
honest provers R1, . . . , Rk for the new (2m+ 1)-turn system. In addition to V and M1, R1 prepares P1 in
his private space. Similarly, in addition to Mi,Ri prepares Pi in his private space for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. R1, . . . , Rk
initially share |ψ2m+1〉 in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk). At the first turn of the constructed proof system,
4Recall that in the original proof system the first turn was done by the provers, hence we do not measure the qubits in each Mi
here.
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Verifier’s Protocol to Reduce the Number of Turns by Half
1. Receive V and M1 from the first prover and Mi from the ith prover for 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
2. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
3. If b = 0, execute a forward-simulation of the original proof system as follows:
3.1 Apply V m+1 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Send b and Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.2 For j = m+ 2 to 2m, do the following:
Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply V j to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Send
Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.3 Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply V 2m+1 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Accept if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) is an accepting state of the original proof system, and
reject otherwise.
4. If b = 1, execute a backward-simulation of the original proof system as follows:
4.1 Send b and Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4.2 For j = m down to 2, do the following:
Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V j)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Send Mi to the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
4.3 Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Apply (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk).
Accept if the qubits in V are in state |0 . . . 0〉, and reject otherwise.
Figure 2: Verifier’s protocol to reduce the number of turns by half.
R1 sends V and M1 to W , while each Ri, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, sends Mi to W . At the (2j − 1)-st turn for
2 ≤ j ≤ m+ 1, if b = 0, each Ri applies Pm+ji (i.e. Pi’s transformation at the (2m + 2j − 1)-st turn in
the original system) while if b = 1, each Ri applies (Pm−j+3i )† (i.e. the inverse of Pi’s transformation at
the (2m − 2j + 5)-th turn in the original system) to the qubits in (Pi,Mi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The provers
R1, . . . , Rk can then clearly convince W with probability at least c if b = 0, and with certainty if b = 1.
Hence, W accepts every input x ∈ L with probability at least 1+c2 .
Soundness: Now suppose that x is not in L. Let R′1, . . . , R′k be arbitrary provers for the constructed
proof system, and let |ψ〉 be an arbitrary quantum state that represents the state just after the first turn in the
constructed system. Suppose that, at the (2j − 1)-st turn for 2 ≤ j ≤ m+ 1, each R′i applies Xji if b = 0
and Y ji if b = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and write X˜j = Xj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xjk and Y˜ j = Y j1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Y jk . Define unitary
transformations U0 and U1 by U0 = V 2m+1X˜m+1V 2m · · · X˜2V m+1 and U1 = (V 1)†Y˜ m+1 · · · (V m)†Y˜ 2,
and let |α〉 = 1‖ΠaccU0|ψ〉‖ΠaccU0|ψ〉 and |β〉 = 1‖ΠinitU1|ψ〉‖ΠinitU1|ψ〉, where Πacc is the projection onto
accepting states in the original proof system and Πinit is the projection on |0 · · · 0〉V in V. Then
‖ΠaccU0|ψ〉‖ = 1‖ΠaccU0|ψ〉‖
∣∣〈ψ|U †0ΠaccU0|ψ〉∣∣ = F (|α〉〈α|, U0|ψ〉〈ψ|U †0) = F (U †0 |α〉〈α|U0, |ψ〉〈ψ|),
and thus, the probability p0 of acceptance when b = 0 is given by p0 = F
(
U †0 |α〉〈α|U0, |ψ〉〈ψ|
)2
. Simi-
larly, the probability p1 of acceptance when b = 1 is given by p1 = F
(
U †1 |β〉〈β|U1, |ψ〉〈ψ|
)2
. Hence the
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probability pacc that W accepts x when communicating with R′1, . . . , R′k is given by
pacc =
1
2
(p0 + p1) =
1
2
(
F
(
U †0 |α〉〈α|U0, |ψ〉〈ψ|
)2
+ F
(
U †1 |β〉〈β|U1, |ψ〉〈ψ|
)2)
.
Therefore, from Lemma 7, we have
pacc ≤ 1
2
(
1 + F
(
U †0 |α〉〈α|U0, U †1 |β〉〈β|U1
))
=
1
2
(
1 + F
(|α〉〈α|, U0U †1 |β〉〈β|U1U †0)) .
Note that Πinit|β〉 = |β〉 and that |β〉 is a legal quantum state which could appear in the original proof system
just after the first turn. Hence, from the soundness property of the original proof system,∥∥ΠaccU0U †1 |β〉∥∥2 = ∥∥ΠaccV 2m+1X˜m+1V 2m · · · X˜2V m+1(Y˜ 2)†V m · · · (Y˜ m+1)†V 1|β〉∥∥2 ≤ s,
since V 1, (Y˜ m+1)†, · · · , V m, (Y˜ 2)†, V m+1, X˜2, · · · , V 2m, X˜m+1, V 2m+1 form a legal sequence of trans-
formations in the original proof system.
Now, from the fact that Πacc|α〉 = |α〉, we have
F
(|α〉〈α|, U0U †1 |β〉〈β|U1U †0) = ∣∣〈α|U0U †1 |β〉∣∣ = ∣∣〈α|ΠaccU0U †1 |β〉∣∣ ≤ ‖ΠaccU0U †1 |β〉‖ ≤ √s.
Hence the probability pacc that W accepts x is bounded by pacc ≤ 12 +
√
s
2 , which completes the proof. 
Now, by repeatedly applying the construction in the proof of Lemma 12, we can reduce the number
of turns to three. The proof is straightforward, but we need to carefully keep track of the efficiency of the
constructed verifiers in each application, since the construction is sequentially applied a logarithmic number
of times.
Lemma 13. For any m ≥ 4 and any c, s such that ε = 1 − c and δ = 1 − s satisfy δ > 2(m− 1)ε,
QMIP(k,m, 1 − ε, 1− δ) ⊆ QMIP
(
k, 3, 1 − 2εm−1 , 1− δ(m−1)2
)
.
Proof. Let l be such that 2l + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2l+1 + 1. Trivially, QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k, 2l+1 + 1, c, s).
We show QMIP(k, 2l+1 + 1, 1− ε, 1− δ) ⊆ QMIP(k, 3, 1 − 2εm−1 , 1− δ(m−1)2 ).
Let L be a language in QMIP(k, 2l+1 + 1, 1− ε, 1 − δ) and let V (0) be the corresponding (2l+1 + 1)-
turn quantum verifier. Given a description of V (0) one can compute in polynomial time a description of
a (2l + 1)-turn quantum verifier V (1) following the proof of Lemma 12. The resulting proof system has
completeness at least 1− ε2 and soundness at most 12 +
√
1−δ
2 ≤ 1− δ4 . Crucially, the description of V (1) is
at most some constant times the size of the description of V (0) plus an amount bounded by a polynomial in
|x|. Hence it is obvious that, given a description of V (0), one can compute in polynomial time a description
of a three-turn quantum verifier V (l) by repeatedly applying the construction in the proof of Lemma 12
l times. The resulting proof system has completeness at least 1− ε
2l
≥ 1− 2εm−1 and soundness at most
1− δ
4l
≤ 1− δ
(m−1)2 , as desired. 
Theorem 4 now follows immediately from Theorem 3 and Lemma 13: For every p ∈ poly there is an
m′ ∈ poly such that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k,m′, 1, 2−p) ⊆ QMIP
(
k, 3, 1, 1 − 1−2−p
(m′−1)2
)
. Now it
suffices to observe that 1−2−p
(m′−1)2 ∈ poly−1.
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5 Public-Coin Systems
In this section we present the last part to complete the proof of Theorem 1. We show how any three-turn
QMIP system with sufficiently large gap can be converted into a two-turn QMIP system with one extra
prover, in which the gap is bounded by an inverse-polynomial. Although we also have a direct proof for
this, given in Appendix B, we will take a detour by showing how (i) any three-turn QMIP system with
sufficiently large gap can be modified to a three-turn public-coin QMIP system with inverse-polynomial gap
without changing the number of provers, and (ii) any three-turn public-coin QMIP system can be converted
into a two-turn QMIP system without changing completeness and soundness, by adding an extra prover.
The added benefits of our detour are a proof of the equivalence of public-coin QMIP systems and general
QMIP systems (Theorem 5) and a proof that QIP and hence PSPACE has a two-prover one-round quantum
interactive proof system of perfect completeness and exponentially small soundness (Corollary 6).5
5.1 Converting to Public-Coin Systems
In this subsection we prove Theorem 5 showing that any language that has a quantum k-prover interactive
proof system with two-sided bounded error also has a public-coin quantum k-prover interactive proof system
of perfect completeness and exponentially small soundness.
We first show that any three-turn QMIP system with sufficiently large gap can be modified to a three-turn
public-coin QMIP system with the same number of provers and inverse-polynomial gap. In the single-prover
case, Marriott and Watrous [MW05] proved a similar statement. Our proof is a generalization of their proof
(Theorem 5.4 in Ref. [MW05]) to the multi-prover case.
Lemma 14. For any c, s satisfying c2 > s, QMIP(k, 3, c, s) ⊆ QMIPpub(k, 3, 1+c2 , 1+
√
s
2 ). Moreover, the
message from the verifier to each prover in the public-coin system consists of only one classical bit.
Proof. Let L be a language in QMIP(k, 3, c, s) and let V be the corresponding three-turn quantum verifier.
We construct a new verifier W for the public-coin system. The idea is that in the first turn W receives the
reduced state in the original register V of the snapshot state just after the second turn (i.e., just after the
first transformation of V ) in the original proof system. W then flips a fair classical coin b ∈ {0, 1} and
broadcasts b to the provers. At the third turn the ith prover is requested to send the register Mi of the original
proof system, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If b = 0 the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) should form the quantum state the
original verifier V would possess just after the third turn of the original proof system. NowW applies V 2 to
the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) and accepts if and only if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) is an accepting state
of the original proof system. On the other hand, if b = 1, the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) should form the
quantum state the original verifier V would possess just after the second turn of the original proof system.
Now W applies (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk) and accepts if and only if all the qubits in V are in
state |0〉. The detailed description of the protocol of W is given in Figure 3. The analysis of completeness
and soundness of the constructed proof system is nearly identical to the one in Lemma 12, and is relegated
to Appendix A. 
Theorem 5 now follows directly from Theorem 4 and Lemma 14 together with se-
quential repetition: Theorem 4 and Lemma 14 imply that there is a p′ ∈ poly
such that QMIP(k,m, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k, 3, 1, 1 − 1p′ ) ⊆ QMIPpub(k, 3, 1, 1 − 14p′ ), since
5The direct proof in Appendix B would only give the weaker corollary that QIP has a two-prover one-round quantum interactive
proof system of perfect completeness, but with soundness only exponentially close to 1
2
. This is indeed weaker than what we can
show with the detour, since it is not known how to amplify the success probability of QMIP systems without increasing either the
number of provers or the number of turns.
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Verifier’s Protocol in Three-Turn Public-Coin System
1. Receive V from the first prover and receive nothing from the ith prover, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
2. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b to each prover.
3. Receive Mi from the ith prover for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3.1 If b = 0, apply V 2 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Accept if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk)
is an accepting state of the original proof system, and reject otherwise.
3.2 If b = 1, apply (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Accept if all the qubits in V are in state
|0〉, and reject otherwise.
Figure 3: Verifier’s protocol in three-turn public-coin system.
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− 1p′
)
≤ 1− 14p′ . Finally, sequential repetition gives that for all p ∈ poly there exists an
m′ ∈ poly such that QMIPpub
(
k, 3, 1, 1 − 14p′
) ⊆ QMIPpub(k,m′, 1, 2−p).
5.2 Parallelizing to Two Turns
Finally, we prove the last piece of Theorem 1 by showing that any three-turn public-coin quantum k-prover
interactive proof system can be converted into a two-turn (i.e., one-round) (k + 1)-prover system without
changing completeness and soundness. The idea of the proof is to send questions only to the first k provers
to request the original second messages from the k provers in the original system and to receive from the
(k + 1)-st prover the original first messages of the k provers in the original system without asking him any
question.
Lemma 15. QMIPpub(k, 3, c, s) ⊆ QMIP(k + 1, 2, c, s).
Proof. Let L be a language in QMIPpub(k,m, c, s) and let V be the corresponding verifier.
The protocol can be viewed as follows: At the first turn, V first receives a quantum register Mi from
the ith prover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. V flips a fair classical coin qM times to generate a random string r of
length qM, and broadcasts r to all the provers. V also stores r in a quantum register Q in his private space.
Finally, at the third turn, V receives a quantum register Ni from the ith prover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. V then
prepares a quantum register V for his work space, where all the qubits in V are initialized to state |0〉, applies
the transformation V final to the qubits in (Q,V,M1, . . . ,Mk,N1, . . . ,Nk), and performs the measurement
Π = {Πacc,Πrej} to decide acceptance or rejection. We construct a two-turn quantum verifier W for the
new quantum (k + 1)-prover interactive proof system for L.
The constructed prover W starts with generating a random string r of length qM in the first turn, and
sends r to the first k provers. W does not send any question to the last prover. In the second turn W
receives Ni from the ith prover expecting the original second message from the original ith prover, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k. From the (k + 1)-st prover W receives k quantum registers M1, . . . ,Mk, expecting the original
first messages of the original k provers. W then proceeds like V would. A detailed description of the
protocol of W is given in Figure 4.
Completeness: Assume the input x is in L. Let P1, . . . , Pk be the honest provers in the original proof
system. Let |ψ1〉 be the quantum state in (M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk) in the original proof system just after the
first turn. We construct honest provers R1, . . . , Rk+1 for the two-turn system. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ri prepares
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Verifier’s Protocol in One-Round System
1. Prepare a quantum register V, and initialize all the qubits in V to state |0〉. Flip a fair classical coin
qM times to generate a random string r of length qM. Store r in a quantum register Q, and send r to
the ith prover for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Send nothing to the (k + 1)-st prover.
2. Receive a quantum register Ni from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and k quantum registers M1, . . . ,Mk
from the (k + 1)-st prover. Apply V final to the qubits in (Q,V,M1, . . . ,Mk,N1, . . . ,Nk) and accept
if and only if the content of (Q,V,M1, . . . ,Mk,N1, . . . ,Nk) is an accepting state of the original proof
system.
Figure 4: Verifier’s protocol to reduce the number of turns to two.
quantum register Pi in his private space, where some of the qubits in Pi form the quantum register Ni,
while Rk+1 prepares the quantum registers M1, . . . ,Mk in his private space. R1, . . . , Rk+1 initially share
|ψ1〉 in (M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk). At the second turn, Rk+1 just sends the qubits in (M1, . . . ,Mk) to W ,
while each Ri, after receiving r, just behaves like Pi would at the third turn of the original system, and then
sends Ni, which is a part of Pi, to W , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It is obvious from the construction that the provers
R1, . . . , Rk+1 can convince W with the same probability with which P1, . . . , Pk could convince V , which
is at least c.
Soundness: Now assume the input x is not in L. Let R′1, . . . , R′k+1 be any provers for the constructed
proof system and let R′i be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of R′i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. For R′k+1, some of the qubits in R′k+1 form the register M = (M1, . . . ,Mk). Let |ψ〉 be
an arbitrary quantum state in (R′1, . . . ,R′k+1) that is initially shared by R′1, . . . , R′k+1. Suppose that, at the
second turn, each R′i applies X
(r)
i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if the message fromW is r. Without loss of generality, we
assume that R′k+1 does nothing, and just sends the qubits in (M1, . . . ,Mk) at the second turn, since R′k+1
receives nothing from W (that R′k+1 applies some transformation Z is equivalent to sharing Z|ψ〉 at the
beginning).
Consider three-turn quantum provers P ′1, . . . , P ′k for the original proof system with the following prop-
erties: (1) each P ′i prepares the quantum register R′i in his private space, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (2) P ′1, . . . , P ′k
initially share |ψ〉 in (R′1, . . . ,R′k+1), where all the qubits in R′k+1 except for those in (M1, . . . ,Mk) are
shared arbitrarily, (3) at the first turn, each P ′i sends Mi to V , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and (4) if the message from V
is r, at the third turn, each P ′i applies X
(r)
i to the qubits in R′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It is obvious that these provers
P ′1, . . . , P
′
k can convince the original verifier V with the same probability that R′1, . . . , R′k+1 can convince
W . Hence, the probability W accepts x is at most s, as desired. 
Now Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 4 and Lemmas 14 and 15. Corollary 6, claiming
QIP ⊆ QMIP(2, 2, 1, 2−p) for any p ∈ poly follows directly from Lemma 15 and the fact shown by Mar-
riott and Watrous [MW05] that any language in QIP can be verified by a three-message public-coin quan-
tum interactive proof system of perfect completeness with exponentially small error in soundness (i.e.,
QIP ⊆ QMAM(1, 2−p) for any p ∈ poly).
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 14
Proof. Completeness: Assume the input x is in L. Let P1, . . . , Pk be the honest quantum provers in the
original proof system with a priori shared state |Φ〉 in (P1, . . . ,Pk). Let |ψ2〉 be the quantum state in
(V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk) just after the second turn in the original proof system. We construct honest
provers R1, . . . , Rk for the public-coin system. In addition to V and M1, R1 prepares P1 in his private
space. Similarly, in addition to Mi, Ri prepares Pi in his private space, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. R1, . . . , Rk initially
share |ψ2〉 in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk,P1, . . . ,Pk). At the first turn of the constructed proof system, R1 sends V to
W , while each Ri, 2 ≤ i ≤ k send nothing to W . At the third turn, if b = 0 each Ri applies P 2i to the qubits
in (Mi,Pi) and then sends Mi to W , while if b = 1, each Ri does nothing and sends Mi to W . It is obvious
that the provers R1, . . . , Rk can convince W with probability at least c if b = 0, and with certainty if b = 1.
Hence, W accepts every input x ∈ L with probability at least 1+c2 .
Soundness: Now suppose that x is not in L. Let R′1, . . . , R′k be arbitrary provers for the con-
structed proof system, and let |ψ〉 be an arbitrary quantum state that represents the state just after the
first turn in the constructed system. Suppose that at the third turn each R′i applies Xi if b = 0 and Yi
if b = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and write X˜ = X1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Xk and Y˜ = Y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Yk. Note that X˜ and Y˜ are
unitary transformations that do not act over the qubits in V. Let |α〉 = 1‖ΠaccV 2 eX|ψ〉‖ΠaccV
2X˜|ψ〉 and
|β〉 = 1‖Πinit(V 1)† eY |ψ〉‖Πinit(V
1)†Y˜ |ψ〉, where Πacc is the projection onto accepting states in the original
proof system and Πinit is the projection onto states in which all the qubits in V are in state |0〉.
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Verifier’s Protocol in One-Round System (Direct Construction)
1. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b only to the first k provers, and send nothing to the
(k + 1)-st prover.
2. Receive Mi from the ith prover, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and V from the (k + 1)-st prover.
2.1 If b = 0, apply V 2 to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Accept if the content of (V,M1, . . . ,Mk)
is an accepting state in the original proof system, and reject otherwise.
2.2 If b = 1, apply (V 1)† to the qubits in (V,M1, . . . ,Mk). Accept if all the qubits in V are in state
|0〉, and reject otherwise.
Figure 5: Verifier’s protocol to reduce the number of turns to two (direct construction).
Then, with a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 12, the probability pacc that W accepts x
when communicating with R′1, . . . , R′k+1 is bounded by
pacc ≤ 1
2
(
1 + F
(
X˜†(V 2)†|α〉〈α|V 2X˜, Y˜ †V 1|β〉〈β|(V 1)†Y˜ ))
=
1
2
(
1 + F
(|α〉〈α|, V 2X˜Y˜ †V 1|β〉〈β|(V 1)†Y˜ X˜†(V 2)†)) .
Since Πinit|β〉 = |β〉 is a legal quantum state which could appear just after the first turn in the
original proof system, V 1,
(
X˜Y˜ †
)
, V 2 form a legal sequence of transformations in the original proof
system, and Πacc|α〉 = |α〉, again a similar argument to that in the proof of Lemma 12 shows that
F
(|α〉〈α|, V 2X˜Y˜ †V 1|β〉〈β|(V 1)†Y˜ X˜†(V 2)†) ≤ √s.
Hence the probability pacc that W accepts x is bounded by pacc ≤ 12 +
√
s
2 , as desired. 
B Direct Proof of Modifying Three-Turn Systems to Two-Turn Systems
For completeness, here we give a direct proof of the fact that any k-prover three-turn system can be converted
into a (k + 1)-prover two-turn system.
Theorem 16. For any c, s satisfying c2 > s, QMIP(k, 3, c, s) ⊆ QMIP
(
k + 1, 2, 1+c2 ,
1+
√
s
2
)
.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 14. Indeed, our starting point is the same, but this time
we move to a two-turn proof system, instead of a three-turn public-coin system, by adding an extra prover.
As in Lemma 15, we first broadcast a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} to all but the extra prover, and ask the extra
prover to send us a register V and the other provers to send us registers Mi. We then proceed as in Step 3 of
the proof system given in Lemma 14: a detailed description is given in Figure 5.
Completeness: This follows immediately from the completeness of the proof system in Lemma 14: in
Lemma 14 the first prover sends both V (before receiving the bit b) and M1 (after); here we can imagine that
before the protocol starts the first prover gives register V to the extra (k + 1)-st prover, who sends it to V.
Soundness: This also follows from the soundness of the proof system in Lemma 14: by combining the
actions of the first prover and the extra (k+1)-st prover (and thus making the provers only stronger), we can
construct a set of provers that would succeed in the proof system of Lemma 14 with the same probability as
they succeed here. 
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